Sectoral tax differentiation has in recent years appeared on the agenda in European policy discussions concerning unemployment. The member countries of the European Union are allowed to reduce the value added tax rates on goods and services that are particularly labor intensive and price elastic. This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the international repercussions of such policies. We develop a two-country and two-sector model with monopolistic competition in the goods market and wage bargaining in the labor market. Policy externalities operate through the endogenously determined terms of trade. We examine how national and supranational commodity tax policies affect sectoral and total employment and characterize optimal commodity taxes with and without international policy cooperation. Some rough estimates of the welfare gains from policy coordination are also presented, using a calibrated version of the model. JEL-Classification: D43, E61, F15, J23, J64.
Introduction
The European Union has imposed restrictions on the use of value added taxes (VAT) in the member states. In 1999, these rules were supplemented with a new directive that extended the range of services that could be subject to reduced tax rates. The motivation for this amendment was explicitly focused on employment objectives: '…the problem of unemployment is so serious that those member states wishing to do so should be allowed to experiment with the operation and impact, in terms of job creation, of a reduction in the VAT on labour-intensive services which are not currently listed…' (Council directive 1999/85/EC). Member states can apply the reduced rates as a three-year experiment, beginning on January 1, 2000. The services concerned must satisfy several requirements, including labor-intensive production and high price elasticity ('…there must be a close link between the lower prices resulting from the rate reduction and the foreseeable increase in demand and employment').
In this paper we analyze the international repercussions of sectoral tax differentiation in an economic union. To that end we develop a two-country and two-sector general equilibrium model of international trade. 1 The two sectors are referred to as tradable and non-tradable, respectively.
We think of the tradable sector as a sector producing goods whereas the non-tradable sector produces services. The model features monopolistic competition in the markets for goods and services and a labor market with union-firm bargaining over wages. Unemployment prevails in general equilibrium. The source of international policy spillovers is the endogenously determined terms of trade. Goods and services may be taxed at different VAT rates. To the extent that services are more labor intensive and more price elastic than goods, employment objectives may suggest lower VAT rates for services. We examine how reduced VAT rates in one sector in one country affects sectoral and total employment at home and abroad. We also characterize optimal sectoral tax differentiation with and without international policy cooperation.
The paper is primarily related to two strands of recent contributions. 2 One strand has explored the case for policy coordination among economies with integrated product markets. This literature includes papers by Andersen and Sørensen (1995) and Andersen et al. (1996) , who analyze optimal fiscal policies with and without international cooperation. The main result is that 1 An earlier and longer version of the paper was circulated under the title 'Economic Integration, Imperfect Competition, and International Policy Coordination' (Holmlund and Kolm, 1999) . 2 There are also some connections to the literature that has examined how product market integration affects wage bargaining and employment in unionized economies. The papers by Andersen and Sørensen (1992) , van der Ploeg (1993, 1995) , Danthine and Hunt (1994) , Huizinga (1993) , Sørensen (1994) and Naylor (1998) belong to this category. uncoordinated fiscal policy is too expansionary. Similar results were obtained -in models without labor market distortions -in earlier contributions by van der Ploeg (1987) , Turnovsky (1988) and Devereux (1991) . This literature ignored sectoral tax differentiation.
The other branch of recent related contributions is the literature on commodity tax competition under destination and origin principles. These contributions include, among others, Keen and Lahiri (1998) and Lockwood (1993 Lockwood ( , 2001 ); see in particular Lockwood (2001) for additional references. The focus of this literature is to compare Nash equilibria under the two principles. The models applied have been diverse and so are the results. Suffice it here to note that the tax competition equilibrium is not generally invariant to a change from a destination to an origin principle.
The previous models employed in the VAT competition literature have assumed competitive labor markets and thus been inappropriate for dealing with employment issues. The present paper attempts to fill some of this gap by providing an analysis where unemployment emerges as an equilibrium outcome. We show that a reduction in the tax rate on services in one country probably will reduce unemployment in that country but it may also increase unemployment in the other country. Increased employment in one country may thus come at the expense of reduced employment in other countries, the reason being the endogenous terms of trade response to national tax policies. We also investigate the welfare implications of tax competition and tax coordination. If transport costs are negligible, it is shown that each country, acting on its own, would set the tax rate on services too low relative to a coordinated policy. The reason is that each country attempts to use tax differentiation as a means to improve its terms of trade. This also implies that the employment objectives pursued under non-cooperative policies will be too ambitious relative to the cooperative welfare maximum. However, if transport costs are substantial, these results may no longer hold.
We proceed by presenting the model in the next section of the paper. Section 3 examines the employment effects of national and supra-national polices concerning sectoral tax differentiation.
Section 4 is devoted to welfare analysis of tax policies with and without policy cooperation. Section 5 concludes.
The model

Overview
We begin with a brief overview of the main ingredients of the model by means of Fig. 1 . There are two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F). In each country there are two sectors, a tradable (T) and a non-tradable (NT) sector. The tradable sector is thought of as producing goods, whereas the nontradable sector produces services. Tradables as well as non-tradables are produced in many varieties. Total employment in the tradable sector is denoted N T j , whereas total employment in the non-tradable sector is denoted N NT j , j=H, F. Labor is the only factor of production.
In Fig. 1 , the dashed and negatively sloped 45-degree lines denoted LF represent the labor force constraints in the countries. In an economy with full employment, the feasible employment combinations would coincide with the labor force constraint. With imperfect labor markets, the feasible employment combinations are located to the left of the labor force constraint, as illustrated in Fig. 1 by the WS-lines. These lines are derived from wage setting behavior; hence the label WS.
The position of a WS-line is determined by labor and product market characteristics within a
country. An increase in wage pressure, caused by, say, higher unemployment benefits or more powerful unions, produces a downward shift of the WS-line. The slope of a WS-line is determined by parameters of the model that capture sectoral differences in the market power of firms and unions. A reallocation of employment across sectors has no effect on total employment if the slope is equal to minus unity; otherwise a reallocation does affect total employment. Moreover, a domestic reduction in the tax on tradables has a direct effect on PS in Home, raising the demand for tradables and inducing a reallocation of employment towards the tradable sector. The increased supply of tradables in Home relative to the supply of tradables in Foreign causes a decline in the price of domestic relative to foreign tradables. This will induce further reallocations of workers towards the tradable sector in Home, whereas the foreign country experiences a reallocation of workers towards their non-tradable sector. These sectoral reallocations affect total employment in each country if the market powers of firms or unions differ across sectors. Total employment increases if there is reallocation of workers towards the sector where the firms have less monopoly power and unions are weaker.
This completes the brief overview of the model. We proceed to the details. The model characterization below pertains to Home; analogous descriptions hold for Foreign.
Consumers
We normalize the number of individuals in each country to unity. There is no labor mobility between countries. Individual i consumes traded ( ) C iT H and non-traded ( ) C iNT H goods and has a utility function given as:
Labor is supplied inelastically without loss of utility. Both tradables and non-tradables appear in many varieties and the sub-utility functions for the different varieties are given as: if he is unemployed. The budget constraint takes the form:
The consumer (producer) price of tradables produced in Home is denoted P The individual demand for the specific goods is derived by maximizing the utility function given by (1) and (2), subject to the budget constraint in (3). From this maximization we derive the aggregate domestic demand function pertaining to a specific firm. This takes the form:
for a firm that produces tradables in Home. I H is the aggregate domestic income whereas P T H is the general price index on tradables relevant for domestic consumers:
Foreign firms set some of the prices in the price index. We derive the expression in the rightmost bracket by assuming symmetric conditions for firms within each country.
A firm in Home producing tradables faces also foreign demand for its product. With equal preferences in the two countries, the aggregate demand relevant for such firm is given by: 
Firms
In each country there are a large number of firms that produce tradables and non-tradables. Only one firm produces a particular variety. Labor is the only factor of production, the production technology is linear and all productivity parameters are normalized to unity. 4 Exports involve 'iceberg' transport costs implying that a fraction of goods shipped abroad evaporates during transit. Markets are segmented because of transport costs, and hence prices for identical products can differ across countries. Firms set prices to maximize profits, taking wages as given. The objective function for a representative domestic firm in the tradable sector can be written as: 
. The product markets are completely integrated when
The following price setting rules are obtained for domestic and foreign markets:
is the usual markup factor. The optimal price in the foreign market is, in general, higher than the domestic price due to transport costs. Once prices are set we obtain output and employment from the relevant demand functions. By aggregating over the domestic firms and 4 By taking labor as the sole factor of production, we cannot explicitly examine whether the effects of tax differentiation depend on differences in the labor intensity of production; cf. the citation from the European Commission above. Our simplification is without loss of generality, however. Suppose that the labor intensity is higher in the non-tradable than in the tradable sector. This would imply that the wage-elasticity of labor demand would be higher among firms producing non-tradables. This dimension is, however, already captured by the assumption that the price-elasticity of demand is higher for non-tradables than for tradables, i.e., µ σ > . using the relationships between consumer and producer prices we obtain the following aggregate labor demand schedule for the domestic tradable sector:
where
are producer price indexes. Aggregate demand for labor in the tradable sector depends on the relative price of domestic goods in the
, as well as the relative price of domestic goods in the foreign market,
It also depends on the aggregate real income in Home and Foreign.
It will be convenient to define the terms of trade as the relative price of domestic tradables in terms of foreign tradables, i.e.,
. By using the expressions for the price indexes for tradables in Home and Foreign we can rewrite (10) and obtain:
) . A rise in p, i.e., a real appreciation experienced by Home, reduces labor demand in the tradable sector. In general equilibrium we also need to consider adjustments in real incomes, something that we do in the subsequent analysis.
Analogous reasoning can be used to derive pricing rules for firms in the non-tradable sector as
. In a symmetric equilibrium, the demand for labor in the non-tradable sector is given by
Wage Determination and the Labor Market
There is one union in each firm and each union cares about the utility of its members. The indirect utility function for the worker is given as 
The union's contribution to the Nash bargain is given by its 'rent', i.e., n V V 
The wage is set as a constant markup on V H , which is the per-period value of unemployment adjusted for dividends. From equations (11) and (12) 
, where r is the discount rate (see Appendix 1 for details).
The relative wage is thus fixed by preference parameters and the measure of union bargaining power. 
The wage equations in (11) and (12) can be expressed as an equilibrium relationship between employment in the two sectors by eliminating V H by means of (14) and by using the labor force identity, i.e., 1
H . The resulting employment relationship takes the form: the assumption that labor demand is relatively more wage-elastic in the non-tradable sector, i.e., µ σ > (absent differences in union bargaining power). The rise in labor demand raises wages and thus crowds out employment in the tradable sector. A wage premium for workers in the tradable sector, Z H < 1, moderates the wage increase since the relative probability of finding a job in the
high-wage sector has decreased. The rise in employment in the non-tradable sector is in this case not completely offset by lower employment in the tradable sector.
General Equilibrium
General equilibrium with a balanced government budget implies balanced trade. The trade balance expression can be written as:
where the first term represents the value of exports and the second term the value of imports. From the individuals' utility maximization we obtain the aggregate domestic demand for tradables produced in Foreign as well as foreigners' aggregate demand for tradables produced in Home. By making use of the price indexes for tradables relevant for domestic and foreign consumers, we obtain the trade balance condition (TB=0) as: We have now derived the relationships needed to characterize the general equilibrium. It will be convenient to make use of the equations for the WS-and PS-lines. To that end we first represent the equilibrium in each country by the following equations:
( ) ( ) 
Eq. (18) reproduces (15) and represents the tradeoff between employment in the two sectors, i.e., the WS-line. Equations (19) and (20) open economy than it would be in a closed economy, given wages and total income. To understand this feature of the model, notice that the opening of the domestic economy to trade has two effects on sales and thereby labor demand. First, the exposure of domestic firms to foreign competition results in some loss in demand as domestic consumers substitute goods produced in Foreign for goods produced in Home. Second, the access to a foreign market implies some gain in demand as foreign consumers substitute goods produced in Home for goods produced in Foreign. Foreign consumers have to spend part of their income to cover transport costs, which implies that the net effect on demand is negative.
To derive the equations for relative labor demand we use (19) and (20) to obtain:
captures relative tax pressure, i.e., the tax pressure in the non-tradable sector relative to the tradable sector. Eq. (24) is the positively sloped PS-schedule, as illustrated in Fig. 1 above. The employment levels in the two domestic and the two foreign sectors, conditional on p, are thus obtained from equations (18) and (24). We note that taxes only affect sectoral and total employment through the relative tax pressure. Total tax pressure does not matter for employment, an implication of iso-elastic utility functions and fixed replacement rates. 7
It remains to determine the terms of trade, i.e., the relative price between domestic and foreign tradables. This is obtained by making use of two relationships: (i) the demand for foreign tradables relative to the demand for domestic tradables, and (ii) the supply of foreign tradables relative to the supply of domestic tradables. To obtain the relative demand schedule we use the two equations in (19) together with the trade balance condition (17), recognizing that prices are set as markups on wages. The resulting relationship gives the demand for foreign tradables relative to domestic tradables as a function of the terms of trade and trade costs, i.e.,
where the right-hand side is increasing in p. A rise in p, i.e., a rise in domestic relative prices, increases the demand for foreign tradables relative to domestic tradables.
To obtain the relative supply schedule we use equations (18) and (24) 
where the right-hand side is non-decreasing in p. Equations (25) and (26) are illustrated in Fig. 2 .
It is easily verified that the slope of (25) is steeper than the slope of (26), the reason being that (26) 7 Many models of equilibrium unemployment have the property that labor and commodity taxes are completely borne by labor if unemployment benefits are indexed to after-tax real wages; see, for example, Pissarides (1990 Pissarides ( , 1998 .
incorporates wage adjustments to changes in the terms of trade, whereas eq. (25) is a demand-side relationship that holds conditional on wages. 8 By equating relative demand and relative supply, i.e., equations (25) and (26), we obtain:
Eq. (27) (18) and (24) determine sectoral employment in each of the two countries along with the terms of trade.
Total employment is given as
This completes the description of the model. We now turn to an investigation of the effects of market integration and the nature of policy spillovers. 
Market Integration and Spillover Effects on Employment
We note from equations (18), (24) and (27) , which involve the trade balance condition. Changes in the terms of trade will in general affect employment in both countries, so policies in one country that affect p will thereby also influence employment in the other country. 8 The relative supply schedule is horizontal if product markets are completely integrated, i.e., if
How does the degree of market integration affect these spillover effects? From (22) and (23) we can conclude that there will be no spillover effects on employment if (i) transport costs are infinitely high or if (ii) transport costs are zero. More specifically we have:
Proposition 1 (i) Infinitely high transport costs:
The fact that spillover effects on employment are absent when transport costs are infinitely high is obvious since there will be no trade in this case. To understand the second and less obvious part of the proposition, note that balanced trade implies that any decline in imports has to be matched by a corresponding decline in exports. A decline in p causes an increase in the domestic consumers' demand for domestic tradables and a reduction in the imports of tradables.
External balance requires an offsetting fall in the foreign demand for domestic goods through a decline in foreign income relative to domestic income, as revealed by eq. (17). The resulting substitution of domestic demand for foreign demand has no effect on domestic labor demand
, since this implies that the prices of domestic tradables are the same at home and abroad. The purchasing power of foreign income in terms of domestically produced goods is thus the same as the purchasing power of domestic income and the reallocation of spending patterns have no real effects. With positive transport costs, however, a reallocation of spending induced by a decline in p does matter for domestic labor demand. The purchasing power of foreign income in terms of domestic tradables is lower than that of domestic income, which implies that the demand for domestic labor increases when domestic demand is substituted for foreign demand. 9
The result that spillover effects on employment vanish as markets become completely integrated does not imply absence of policy externalities with respect to social welfare. Changes in the terms of trade affect welfare directly even if there is no effect on employment. This implies, as discussed in the next section, that policy externalities prevail even if markets are completely integrated.
From here on we will, unless stated otherwise, present results that hold for strictly positive transport costs. 10
Employment effects of tax differentiation
We now turn to the employment effects of commodity taxation. The national policy is represented by the relative tax in Home, i.e., )
; recall that the total tax pressure has no effects on sectoral or total employment. The analysis of foreign policies is analogous and therefore omitted. We also examine the consequences of supranational (global) policies, i.e., simultaneous changes of domestic and foreign policies. The government's budget is always balanced. 11
Consider first a domestic policy that changes the tax on non-tradables relative to the tax on tradables. By making use of equations (18), (24) and (27), we can conclude:
Proposition 2 An increase in domestic relative tax pressure (
, but reduces p and
; analogously, the effect on
To understand the effects on employment, consider first the direct effect in Home. A rise in H θ due to, for example, a reduction in H T t implies lower consumer prices of tradables, which result in expanding employment. The resulting decline in unemployment increases domestic wage demands, which leads to higher wages and prices and falling employment in the nontradable sector; the economy thus moves along its WS-schedule as employment is reallocated towards the tradable sector. This process also implies that the supply of domestic tradables increases relative to the supply of foreign tradables, which has to be accompanied by a real depreciation, i.e., a decline in p. This decline in p reduces the relative demand for tradables in Foreign; there is a further upward shift of the domestic PS-schedule whereas the foreign PSschedule shifts downwards. The resulting increase in foreign unemployment leads to wage moderation and thereby to rising employment in the foreign non-tradable sector.
10 Holmlund and Kolm (1999) include an analysis of how transport costs affect employment and real wages in the present model. 11 The government's budget restriction is given as: employment, but the increase may come at the expense of employment abroad.
The effects of a global tax policy ) ( θ θ θ = = F H are more difficult to characterize. The effect on p is ambiguous, as it is generally unclear how the relative supply of domestic vs foreign tradables is affected, i.e., we cannot determine whether (26) in Fig. 2 shifts up or down. The effect on p is zero in a symmetric world, in which case the relative supply of domestic vs foreign tradables is unaffected by the policy. In the symmetric case we can conclude that there will be a reallocation of employment towards the tradable sector in both countries; absent effects on p, we are left with only the direct effects of the policy. Lower taxes on services would thus increase total employment in both countries as long as the demand for services is more price-elastic. 
Welfare analysis
We proceed to a characterization of non-cooperative and cooperative tax policies. The social welfare function is taken to be utilitarian and is obtained through summation of the individual indirect utility functions. Welfare for Home is then given as:
are aggregate nominal profits in the two sectors, distributed to individuals as dividends. By using the expression for profits and the government budget restriction, we can write social welfare as
, which corresponds to the real value of the domestic aggregate production. Moreover, by using the trade balance condition we obtain:
The first term is the real income that captures the real value of aggregate domestic consumption, whereas the second term represents the waste due to transport costs. For obvious reasons there will be no waste when F H = 0 and hence 1 = H τ .
No transport costs
We first consider uncoordinated optimal tax policies in the limiting case with zero domestic transport costs, i.e., 1 = H τ . We also assume 1 = F τ , although this is not crucial as long as we focus on optimal policy in Home. Only the relative tax pressure influences social welfare and the relevant policy instrument is therefore H θ . 12 The specific tax rates follow residually from the optimal relative tax pressure and the government's budget constraint. The optimal relative tax pressure in Home, taking policy in Foreign as given, is given by:
efficiency in the output mix. If the service sector is more price elastic, implying µ σ > and thus T NT κ κ < , the price of tradables tends to be too high (and consumption too low) compared to the price (and consumption) of services. This calls for higher taxes on services and lower taxes on tradables, so as to induce an increase in the production of tradables.
The factor in the second parenthesis of (29) suggests, by contrast, that the service sector should be taxed at a lower rate if µ σ > . The reason is that µ σ > implies Z H < 1 absent sectoral differences in the bargaining power of unions (cf. eq. (13)). The more price-elastic the demand for the product is, the more wage-elastic is the demand for labor and the lower the bargained wage.
From proposition (2) we know that a lower tax rate on services increases aggregate employment 
The reaction function for the foreign government can be derived in a similar fashion, yielding 
It is straightforward to verify that N θ is increasing in µ . Moreover, we have
. The lower µ is, the higher (in absolute value) the elasticity
. A low value of µ means that the relative demand for tradables produced in Home is not very sensitive to changes in p; sizeable changes in p are therefore required so as to maintain equilibrium in the market for tradables when taxes are changed.
Positive transport costs
If transport costs are positive, we have to consider how the tax structure affects the amount of waste, i.e., the second term in (28'). A look at this term reveals that the direct effect of a higher H θ , given p, is to reduce the real value of the waste. The induced reduction in p will, however, also affect the real value of the waste. The net effect on the waste of a lower p is positive because the export of tradables increases.
The fact that the waste increases with a lower p gives an additional incentive for the domestic government to reduce H θ ; recall that the real value of income, i.e., the first term in the welfare measure, falls with a lower p. It is hence tempting to believe that governments in a Nash equilibrium will chose too low levels of j θ also when there are positive transport costs. This may, however, not be the case because there will be a direct cross-country effect from the relative tax pressure when policies are coordinated. In fact, a higher F θ tends to increase the waste in Home by increasing the volume of exports. This relationship is ignored in a Nash equilibrium but internalized with coordinated policies. In the latter case it is recognized that a lower F θ also reduces the waste in Home, which implies incentives to lower the relative tax pressure relative to the uncoordinated equilibrium. It is not possible to analytically determine whether or not the relative tax pressure is set too low or too high in a Nash equilibrium.
Numerical examples
We have undertaken numerical experiments in order to shed some light on the magnitude of the welfare effects. The results are displayed in Table 1 . The model is calibrated so as to produce an unemployment rate of 10 percent for the case with zero transport costs and symmetric sectors as well as symmetric countries. We present six different cases involving three constellations of structural parameters - (positive transport costs). 15 The countries are always symmetric whereas the sectors may be asymmetric. Sectoral asymmetries are caused either by differences in preference parameters or by differences in the bargaining power of unions.
The simulations confirm what we already knew from Proposition 4: the non-tradable sector is taxed too little when there are no transport costs and the countries act independently of each other. In the case with positive transport costs, it was not possible to determine analytically whether or not the relative tax pressure was set too low or too high in a Nash equilibrium compared to a coordinated equilibrium. The numerical simulations suggest here that nontradables are taxed too heavily compared to the coordinated outcome. The fact that an increase in the relative tax pressure abroad increases the waste at home induces the relative tax pressure to be set lower in a coordinated equilibrium, although there is a tendency for non-coordinated countries to set a too low level of the relative tax pressure due to the terms of trade effect.
would imply transport costs corresponding to one third of the value of exports. The empirical studies suggest much smaller costs for freight and insurance (see Rauch, 1999) . The total costs of trade across country borders should, however, also include other elements, such as differences in culture, language, lack of direct contact etc. These other elements are not easily estimated. N SW and N θ represent social welfare and the relative tax pressure in the Nash equilibria. SW C and C θ represent the cooperative cases. Social welfare is normalized to 100 in the Nash cases for the three parameter sets and the two trade cost regimes.
The numerical examples suggest that the impact on the terms of trade, p, of changes in j θ is small in general. This implies that sectoral employment, and hence the unemployment rate, is not substantially affected by the changes in relative tax pressure working through p. However, with very low values of µ it is possible to obtain some sizeable action in p. The reason for this was highlighted by the analytical special case given below proposition 4. When µ is low, the relative demand for tradables produced in Home is not very sensitive to change in p. Hence sizeable changes in p are required in order to maintain equilibrium in the market for tradables when taxes are changed. However, although one can obtain sizeable changes in p from changes in the relative tax pressure when µ is small, the induced effects on relative employment is quite small even in this case. The welfare gains from coordinated tax policies appear also to be very small.
These basic results are robust for alternative reasonable parameter values. We have systematically altered each of the parameters in all the six cases so as to check how sensitive the results are. We have also varied the various parameter values in order to investigate the effects on the terms of trade. Although the parameters sometimes took somewhat implausible values, it turned out to be difficult to get a sizeable effect on the terms of trade. Only the choice of a low level of µ seems to produce a quantitatively significant action in the terms of trade.
Concluding remarks
The European Union has recently proposed sectoral tax differentiation as a policy to fight unemployment. The member countries are allowed to reduce the VAT rates on goods and services that are particularly labor intensive and price elastic. Our paper has provided a theoretical analysis of the international repercussions of such policies. To that end we have developed a two-country and two-sector model with monopolistic competition in the goods markets and wage bargaining in the labor markets. The terms of trade is endogenously determined in the model and unemployment prevails in general equilibrium.
We have found that a reduction in the tax rate on more price elastic goods in one country (Home) most likely reduces unemployment in that country, but probably raises unemployment in the other country (Foreign). The reason is that the policy induces a reallocation of workers in
Home towards the sector where unions and firms have less market power -the service sectorwhereas the reallocation has the opposite direction in Foreign. The reallocation of workers in
Foreign is driven by changes in the terms of trade: the decline in the supply of tradables produced in Home causes a terms of trade improvement for Home but a terms of trade deterioration for Foreign. Increased employment in one country may thus come at the expense of reduced employment in other countries. However, a coordinated reduction in the tax rate on relatively price elastic goods will reduce unemployment in both countries, at least as long as the countries are symmetric (in which case there will be no effect on the terms of trade).
We have also explored the welfare implications of national and supranational tax policies.
The results here are sensitive to the degree of product market integration, i.e., the magnitude of transport costs. If transport costs are negligible, we demonstrated analytically that each country, acting on its own, would set the tax rate on services too low relative to what a coordinated policy would imply. The reason is that each country attempts to use tax differentiation as a means to improve its terms of trade. This also implies that the employment objectives pursued under noncooperative policies will be too ambitious relative to the cooperative welfare maximum.
However, if transport costs are substantial, the aforementioned results may no longer hold.
Indeed, our numerical results suggest that uncoordinated polices may imply too high taxes on services when there are sizeable transport costs.
Although the presence of policy externalities provides a case for policy coordination, our numerical calibrations suggest that the gains from coordinated tax policies are small. Of course, these simulations are mainly illustrative, and the model is fairly specific, but they do give pause to proposals to impose supranational restrictions on sectoral differentiation of value added taxes. 16 Our analysis has taken the number of firms in each country as exogenously fixed. An interesting but nontrivial extension would be to allow for free entry and an endogenous determination of the number of product varieties. We also believe that our framework can be used to shed light on issues in trade policy. Indeed, our measure of waste due to trade can be reinterpreted as export taxes and it is possible to derive optimal export taxes (or subsidies) with and without policy cooperation. These and other extensions are left for future work.
Van der Ploeg, F. (1987) . 'Coordination of Optimal Taxation in a Two-Country Equilibrium Model', Economics Letters, 24, 279-85.
Appendix 1 The Labor Market 17
The indirect utility function for the worker is given as r is the discount rate and q i is the exogenous probability that a worker is separated from his job in sector i, i=T, NT. The probability of leaving unemployment for employment in sector i is denoted a i . The workers have no sector-specific skills and move between firms through a spell of unemployment. On-the-job search and job-to-job mobility are ruled out by assumption.
From (A1) we can derive expressions for the utility differences between employment and unemployment: 17 The model of the labor market draws on Holmlund (1997) and Kolm (1998) . 18 The value functions in (A1) are consistent with a continuous time formulation where q i and a i are interpreted as transition rates.
